This paper examines one political-economy aspect of the European Communities' (EC) anti-dumping policy that has tended to be overlooked in prior studies; namely, the role that member states play in deciding whether to impose definitive duties on imports that have been found to be dumped and that are deemed to have injured a European industry. We find that, in the late 1990s, numerous disagreements between member states occurred over the merits of imposing anti-dumping duties. These disagreements may well have been partly responsible for the strong decline in the number of European anti-dumping investigations initiated after 1999.
1.

Introduction.
In 2002, the then-fifteen members of the European Union (EU) imported a total of $933.1 billion of merchandise imports from non-EU trading partners. The very fact that the EC anti-dumping policy could influence just under one trillion dollars of international commerce is an indication of the potential importance of this form of contingent protection. With the enlargement of the EU in May 2004 the terms upon which goods enter another ten nations became conditioned in part by the EC's rules on dumped imports. These considerations, plus the concern that the phase-out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in January 2005 will lead to a wave of unfair and/or fair trade investigations, highlight the importance of understanding the causes and consequences of EC anti-dumping policy.
In this paper we document and assess the role that the EU member states have played in influencing the outcome of anti-dumping proceedings. This contrasts with existing studies of the political economy of anti-dumping protection in Europe, which have tended to emphasise the role of political and technocratic influences on the dumping and injury investigations. 4 Our starting point is that, under EC procedures of long standing, after an investigation by the European Commission has determined that certain imports were dumped and have caused injury, duties can only be imposed if a simple majority of the EU member states vote in favour of such protection. Moreover until recently (March 2004) , EC anti-dumping rules were such that an abstention by a member state on a vote to impose such duties was actually counted as a vote against imposition. Therefore, before the rule change, eight of the then-fifteen member states had to vote in favour of imposing anti-dumping duties and associated measures for them to come into effect.
We suspect that the reason scholars have not studied the determinants and effects of member states' votes on European anti-dumping matters is that the records of such votes are not published. However, all is not lost as the outcomes of these votes (and other declarations of member states' views) are often leaked to business newspapers and specialist periodicals. We performed extensive searches of a leading database of media outlets and have assembled a collection of over sixty news articles that shed light on the pattern of member state voting on anti-dumping measures since 1991. We are, for example, able to calculate the proportion of votes (or similar expressions of views) that each of the fifteen (pre-2004 enlargement) member states cast in favour of restrictive measures.
5 In fact, we are able to identify two blocks of member states, one that routinely supports the imposition of anti-dumping measures and one that opposes them. Moreover, an examination of these newspaper articles lead to the identification of six means by which the European Commission has altered the proposed scope of anti-dumping duties or investigations so as to increase the number of member states favouring the imposition of measures. In addition, these news articles enabled us to identify eight diplomatic factors which are said to have influenced either member states' voting behaviour or the European Commission's proposals for definitive duties. To the extent that EU member states are responsive to the European Commission's overtures, to diplomatic considerations, as well as to the traditional interests of import-competing and importbuying domestic agents, then the political economy of EC anti-dumping policy may be more complex than the extant literature appears to suggest.
Our examination of the member states' voting patterns has led to other findings. First, the public disagreements between member states over two anti-dumping investigations into cotton in the late 1990s are just two public examples of a larger number of such disagreements since 1997. Moreover, the reduced likelihood that the European Commission's proposals for definitive duties will be adopted may well account, in part, for the falling number of EC anti-dumping investigations that have been initiated after 1999. (The number of such investigations initiated fell in absolute numbers and as a share of the total number of OECD members' anti-dumping investigations and, for that matter, as a share of the worldwide total also.) Second, we discuss the possible implications of a recent change in EC rules on counting abstentions in votes on definitive duties which is likely to favour the emergence of simple majorities for imposing such duties. Third, the recent enlargement of the EU may well alter the membership of the two blocks that consistently vote for or against definitive duties. We examine the record of recent antidumping investigations by the ten new accession countries, and find that only two of them (Poland and Lithuania) have been quite active users of this form of contingent protection since 1995.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A short account of the EC's antidumping procedures is given in the next section, along with recent statistics on the number of anti-dumping investigations by the European Commission. The third section describes the sources used in this study and summarises the evidence (such as it is) on the voting patterns and other declared views of EU member states on anti-dumping investigations and proposed duties. The fourth section describes the manner in which diplomatic factors and steps taken by the European Commission are said to have potentially influenced the votes of member states. The fifth section discusses the possible effects of the recent enlargement of the EU on the voting patterns for definitive duties, and appropriate caveats are made for what is necessarily a speculative exercise. Some concluding remarks are offered in section six.
2.
The EC anti-dumping system and the role of the member states.
Once an anti-dumping complaint about foreign imports has been received by the European Commission, a multi-step process begins. Three of the four most important steps are carried out by the European Commission; namely, the dumping investigation, the injury investigation 6 , and the determination of whether the imposition of antidumping duties would be in the Community's interest. During these three steps the European Commission is mandated to consult the member states, often through meetings of the Anti-dumping Advisory Committee, but the views of the member states are not legally binding.
Before definitive duties are imposed, however, another important step must be taken. Specifically, a simply majority in the European Council (that comprises the member states) must vote in favour of a European Commission proposal to that effect. Moreover before 8 March 2004, when new regulations came into effect, abstentions by member states in such votes were counted against proposals to impose duties. This implied that, before the recent enlargement of the EU, eight member states had to vote in favour of Commission proposals to impose duties. In sum, although the European Commission plays an important role in the prior three steps, it is the member states acting collectively that finally determine whether anti-dumping duties are imposed on imports into the European Union.
It is an interesting question as to whether this fourth step essentially politicises the supply of protection against dumped imports in the European Union. Although we will return to this matter later in the paper, a few preliminary comments are in order. If the member states view their role as essentially that of ratifying the outcomes of a technocratic Commission-led process, then it would be difficult to make the case for politicisation. If, however, member states consider the likely effects of proposed duties on the relevant import-competing and import-purchasing interests in their jurisdictions, then a different hypothesis arises; namely, national economic interests (mediated through national political institutions) may well determine votes in the European Council on imposing definitive duties and the views expressed in the Anti-dumping Advisory Committee. Furthermore, to the extent that the latter is true, and supposing that the Trade Directorate of the European Commission has come to a view as to the desirability of imposing duties, then a related hypothesis arises-that the European Commission tailors and amends proposals for definitive duties so as to encourage the creation of a simple majority in favour of imposing duties. Readers may want to bear these different hypotheses in mind when evaluating the evidence presented in subsequent sections of this paper.
Practitioners and others have noted a change in the role played by member states in EC anti-dumping investigations in recent years. Prior to 1995 it is said that a spirit of "live and let live" co-operation prevailed and that the member states tended to support the European Commission's proposals to impose definitive anti-dumping duties. Since 1995, however, disagreements between member states and between the European Commission and the member states are said to have occurred more frequently. The anti-dumping cases involving Cotton Fabrics (two cases), Hot Rolled Flat (Steel) Coils, and Carbon Black are said to exemplify this new trend.
The Cotton fabrics cases are probably the best example of this trend. The European cotton producers' association (Eurocoton) had originally filed an anti-dumping complaint against all types of cotton fabrics in 1997. In the EU, cotton fabrics are essentially produced in France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Most other Member States import cotton fabrics from countries such as India, Pakistan, and Egypt, the targets of the Eurocoton complaint.
After the European Commission had completed its investigation and recommended definitive duties, most importing Member States voted against such measures. Eurocoton then filed a new complaint, this time targeting only Unbleached cotton fabrics, but again the European Commission failed to garner enough support for the imposition of measures in 1998.
Eurocoton later challenged the failure of the European Council to adopt definitive measures before the European courts. On appeal, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) agreed with Eurocoton that the European Council had failed to motivate why it had rejected the measures proposed by the European Commission.
7 Thus, while the ECJ did not necessarily find that the European Council had decided wrongly, it did rule that the European Council has an obligation to motivate its decision. This motivation requirement arguably makes it more difficult for the European Council to disagree with a Commission proposal to adopt definitive measures because if the European Council does so, it will have to explain why.
Another potentially important recent change in the EC anti-dumping system, which came into effect on 8 March 2004, has been to count abstentions in the European Council on votes to impose definitive duties as votes in favour of imposing such measures.
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Opponents of a proposed set of duties will now have to explicitly vote against definitive duties, rather than following the diplomatically more convenient route of abstaining. To the extent that "smaller" member states find it more difficult to oppose a coalition in favour of imposing duties that includes certain "larger" member states, then this change almost surely increases the likelihood that more definitive duties will be imposed in the future. Number of cases Figure 1 , after the controversial cotton cases in 1997 and 1998, the number of anti-dumping investigations initiated indeed falls after 1999. Moreover, the EU share of the total number of anti-dumping investigations by OECD nations fell also, as did the EU share of total worldwide investigations. The latter suggests that there may be something EUspecific about the downturn in anti-dumping investigations, perhaps augmenting the effect of the late 1990s boom in the number of anti-dumping complaints made by firms in Europe and elsewhere. 9 It is not our contention that variables such as the exchange rate and economic growth are irrelevant to understanding the intertemporal pattern of EC antidumping investigations. Nor do we claim that the observed downturn in investigations by the European Commission since 1999 is permanent; rather we note that this downturn has coincided with a growing propensity on the part of some member states to question the European Commission's proposals for the imposition of definitive duties.
3.
Evidence on member states' views on EC anti-dumping investigations and proposals for definitive duties.
As noted earlier, the European Commission is obliged to consult the member states concerning on-going anti-dumping investigations. Moreover, proposals for definitive duties must receive the support of a simple majority in the European Council before being implemented. Unfortunately, the tallies of votes and views expressed by member states on such matters are not published in any official document of the European Union. However, such votes and views are often leaked to newspapers and specialist periodicals. In this section we describe the method used to assemble a collection of media articles that shed light on member states' votes and views on EC anti-dumping matters. We also summarise the contents of these articles, including the construction of a summary table that reports each member state's propensity to vote for definitive anti-dumping duties and for various steps in the EC anti-dumping procedure that could lead to such duties. The caveats and drawbacks of our approach are discussed in some detail also.
The database Factiva was the source of the newspaper and periodical articles assembled for this paper. The search function of this electronic database, which includes articles from over 9,000 sources, was used to locate newspaper and other accounts of the votes and views of member states on EC anti-dumping investigations between 1991 and 2003. Appendix Table 1 contains short descriptions of 67 articles that form the evidential base of this study. For each of the articles listed in that table, the source of the article, the date of publication, the good that was the subject of the anti-dumping investigation or measure, the subject trading partners, the reported votes of the member states (where available), the steps taken by the European Commission and trading partners to influence the member states' views on the anti-dumping matter in question, are all reported. The articles reported in Appendix Table 1 were published in English, although a significant fraction are likely to have been translations of articles that were probably first published by French media outlets. One of the potential difficulties associated with using different newspaper sources is that they may report contradictory accounts of the member states' views and votes. 10 In the few instances were actual or potential inconsistencies were found, we gave each of the relevant news articles a separate entry in Appendix Table 1 . Moreover, we footnoted those inconsistencies, enabling the reader to directly compare the statements made in the relevant news articles.
The newspaper articles listed in Appendix Table 1 refer to six distinct stages of the EC anti-dumping procedure, see Table 3 . A majority of the articles (54) refer to the three stages from the imposition of preliminary duties (denoted as stage P in Table 3 and  Appendix Table 1 ) to the decision to impose definitive duties (denoted as stage D.) Few articles refer to the member states' views on initiating investigations, terminating investigations, and reviews of an existing anti-dumping measure.
With some notable exceptions (such as personal fax machines, pocket lighters, and hair brushes, and arguably photocopies and leather bags), the overwhelming majority of newspaper articles listed in Appendix Table 1 refer to anti-dumping investigations involving intermediate goods. That member states should disagree on the merits on antidumping measures on such goods is perhaps unsurprisingly, given that the commercial interests that import intermediate goods may find it easier to make representations to their national governments than do personal consumers. 10 Of course, another concern is that a newspaper report is inaccurate even when it is not contradicted by another newspaper report. Given the secrecy attendant in EC anti-dumping system checking for inaccuracy is impossible, whereas checking for consistency (when more than one media outlet reports on the same event) is, in principle, feasible. This is an important caveat that the reader might bear in mind. Table 4 ). This finding is another manifestation of the longstanding debate within Europe as to the appropriate means to respond to the rise of import competition from lower-wage Asian economies.
For each member state we also counted the number of times where a media report stated that it had voted (or expressed an opinion) in favour of, or against, a step in the EC antidumping process that could lead to the imposition of definitive duties. (We also counted the number of reported abstentions by each member state.) The results are reported in Table 5 . In the case of Portugal, for example, there are 19 explicit references in the media articles (assembled in Appendix Table 1 ) to that member state's views on EC antidumping investigations. In each of the 19 references, Portugal indicated a preference for imposing definitive duties or for taking steps that could result in such duties being imposed. In our sample, therefore, Portugal had a 100 percent rate of support for the European Commission's anti-dumping investigations and related proposals.
The member states in Table 5 are listed in descending order of that rate of support. Five member states (Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, and Spain) have on 85 percent or more occasions supported steps towards anti-dumping duties. It would seem that these five countries represent the core of support for anti-dumping measures against Europe's trading partners. In contrast, six EU member states (Luxembourg, Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark) have supported steps towards anti-dumping measures less than 15 percent of the time. The U.K. rate of support is just above the 15 percent level (at 15.6%), suggesting that in recent years opponents to the imposition of antidumping measures were just short of a simple majority. Therefore, on the voting rules that prevailed before 8 March 2004, if one or two additional member states could be persuaded to abstain (or even to vote against), then a proposal for definitive duties would be rejected. Table 5 also provides information on the reported votes for definitive duties. The number of news articles where the votes of member states are explicitly reported is small, but the results may be of interest. Broadly speaking, the findings in the last paragraph are confirmed. Five member states appear to consistently vote for definitive duties, and seven vote against. Interestingly, when it comes to deciding on definitive duties (rather than on the intermediate stages leading up to proposals for such duties), Belgium tends to vote with the pro-duties block of member states. As a result, on a typical vote two small member states (Austria and Luxembourg) essentially determine whether there is a simple majority in favour of imposing definitive duties. On the basis of the findings in Table 5 , it would appear that the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU in 1995 effectively added two members to the anti-duties block of member states and no members to the pro-duties block. 11 This, in turn, suggests the following hypothesis: the greater strength of the anti-duties block after the 1995 accessions emboldened these member states to contest more frequently the European Commission's proposals for definitive duties. In addition, so as to signal their opposition to definitive duties, this block of seven member states tended to voice their concerns throughout the entire investigative process, a strategy whose goal may have been to both discourage the proponents of duties and to reduce the expected payoff to any member state that contemplates using its swing vote strategically.
An indication of the potential implications of the recent (8 March 2004) change in the manner in which abstentions are counted can be deduced from the news articles collected for this study. In Table 6 eight instances are listed where the reported abstentions of member states would (under the new rules) have resulted in a simple majority in favour of either definitive duties or steps that could result in such duties.
12 Table 6 also identifies those member states whose abstentions would have "tipped the balance" in favour of adopting definitive duties or of a majority emerging in support of the various step taken by the European Commission in its investigations. In this regard, from 1998 until 2003 three small member states (Austria, Luxembourg, and Belgium) appear to have held some sway. 
4.
Steps taken to influence the views of member states on anti-dumping matters.
An examination of the press materials assembled for this paper suggests that it would be a mistake to believe that no attempts, other than by domestic economic interests, are made to influence the views of EU member states on anti-dumping matters. In this section we document two types of third party influence (from the European Commission itself and from diplomatic pressure by non-EU countries that are the targets of EC antidumping investigations) and the means by which that influence is exercised.
In principle the European Commission could take steps to dissuade as well as to persuade member states from supporting a given set of proposed anti-dumping duties or a given anti-dumping investigation. We searched for evidence for either proposition, and could not find a single newspaper article that reported attempts (successful or otherwise) by the European Commission to reduce the level of member state support for a set of proposed duties. In contrast, six steps were identified that the European Commission has taken so as to increase the number of member states in favour of imposing anti-dumping duties (see Table 7 ). It should be noted, however, that most of these steps involved paring back the scope or duration of proposed anti-dumping duties. The European Commission, it would seem, is keen to get anti-dumping duties imposed and is willing to sacrifice some of the restrictive impact of those duties so as to build a constituency in favour of their imposition. Table 7 : Six steps that the European Commission is reported to have taken or offered to take so as to increase the number of member states voting for antidumping duties.
Step Removal of specified products from the scope of the antidumping order or duties.
40, 42
The findings in Table 7 suggest another possible hypothesis concerning the strategy of European Commission when dealing with member states on anti-dumping matters. That is, might a strategy be to initially propose duties of a scope and duration that exceed the European Commission's preferred levels knowing that the proposed duties are likely to be whittled down as the deadline for deciding whether to adopt definitive duties approaches? Put succinctly, could the expectation of future bargaining between the member states and the European Commission influence the contents of the latter's proposal for definitive duties in the first place?
13 If this hypothesis is correct then one cannot conclude that the magnitudes of any imposed anti-dumping duties are necessarily reduced because of the requirement to persuade a simple majority of the member states to support the introduction of definitive duties.
In Table 8 eight diplomatic factors, which were reported in media articles as potential influences on the positions of member states on anti-dumping measures, are listed. In two cases (anti-dumping actions against Norway and Turkey) other factors affecting the EU's relationship with the target country are said to be important. In addition to lobbying and warnings of retaliation, geo-political factors also seem to be important. For example, in 2003, Spain, the U.K., and the Netherlands are said to have opposed the introduction of duties on imports of hot rolled steel from Egypt, so as to encourage the latter not to openly oppose the invasion of Iraq. It would seem, from the findings in Table 8 and the statements reported in the last column of Appendix Table 1 , that the disagreements among member states over antidumping matters since 1997 have not gone unnoticed by the targets of EC anti-dumping investigations, and that the governments of the latter nations have in some cases augmented any representations made to the European Commission with those to the member states. In this instance, the growing politicisation of the EC's anti-dumping procedure (through a greater reluctance of member states to acquiesce to the proposals of the European Commission) is likely to have reduced the number and severity of the EC's anti-dumping measures. 14 The latter depend in part on the membership of the European Union and on the foreign policy interests of the member states. Looking forward, this observation highlights the role of the ten new member states that joined the EU in May 2004; a factor that we turn to now. Although certainly not conclusive evidence, these statistics suggest that the majority of the new EU members have not relied extensively on anti-dumping protection in the recent past and, as such, many are unlikely to be immediate candidates to join the produties block on the European Council. However, there is a countervailing tendency that may offer little comfort to the existing members of the anti-duties block. Since most of the acceding members are small countries, and given the tendency for such countries to abstain on votes on EC anti-dumping matters, then (under the new rules for counting abstentions) it may be harder to obtain a simple majority against any proposed duties.
Concluding remarks.
Like much of the political economy literature on the U.S. anti-dumping system, many analyses of the EC anti-dumping procedure focus on the relative influence of economic and non-economic factors on the dumping and material injury investigations conducted by the European Commission. Without denying the importance of such studies, we have argued here that the role of member states in the EC anti-dumping system is significant, especially since 1997. A seven-strong anti-anti-dumping duties' block appears to have emerged among member states in the late 1990s, and they increasingly contest proposals for definitive duties made by the European Commission. This opposition also coincided with a sharp fall in the number of EC anti-dumping investigations from 1999 (both in absolute terms and as a share of the OECD total.) A shift from a Commission-dominated or "technocratic" anti-dumping system towards a more member-state influenced or "politicised" one has occurred.
We also draw out a number of potential implications of this more politicised system for the strategies of the European Commission and for opponents of anti-dumping duties, both within the EU and abroad. The likely effects of the recent rule changes on voting on EC anti-dumping measures and of enlargement were also discussed. From a comparative perspective perhaps the most important implication of this study is to call into question the presumption, widespread in the US literature, that (ideally) steps should be taken to depoliticise the supply of contingent protection. Recent European experience may serve as an important counter-example to this argument. 15 In this regard it is also worth noting that, for at least six years, the Government of France has been arguing for a more technocratic and less politicised system to administer anti-dumping in Europe, precisely because "politics" is increasingly seen as reducing the supply of contingent protection.
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The study of member states' influence on the EC anti-dumping system deserves, in our view, more analysis. However, research is hampered by the absence of publicly available and official records of the opinions expressed and the votes of member states on EC antidumping matters. This is likely to frustrate the development of econometric analyses comparable to the study of the voting records of commissioners of the U.S. International 15 One possible explanation for the differences across the Atlantic in this regard is that the governments of EU member states may be more responsive to the pleas of the buyers of imports than U.S. legislators because of the diversity of economic activity is on average greater in a EU member state than in a U.S. congressional district or a U.S. state. 16 Reports on the original French proposals to this effect can be found in Wall Street Journal Europe (1998) and Reuters News (1998).
Trade Commission. Like us, others are probably going to have to rely on second-hand sources, with all of the concerns that this raises. On a positive note, our analysis might usefully be complemented by detailed case studies of some of the major anti-dumping investigations reported on in Appendix Table 1, in particular the cases involving cotton and hot rolled flat steel. These case studies might enrichen our understanding of the relative importance of the economic, diplomatic, political, and other factors that determine the degree of anti-dumping protection in Europe.
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